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Abstract
In a cloud scenario outsourcing data to third party providers enables processing
benefits and significant cost. As a result there is a high tendency of different
companies to outsource their data and services to third party service providers.
On the other hand, there exists a high concern when it comes to privacy of the
outsourced data. Since in a storage system a side channel attack is possible,
it can cause the leakage of sensitive information, outsourcing comes with an
expensive price, thus we need to develop algorithms which can prevent such
information to be known by cloud providers. The security issues here are: ma-
licious insiders, data locality, lack of control of the outsourced data, legislation
issues, data and service availability, vendor lock-in etc.
The main goal of the thesis is to do a research over the existing algorithms
which are used by cloud computing platforms in order to prevent such leakage
information and to develop and implement a suitable protocol which can hide
such sensitive information from cloud providers. Private Information Retrieval
Protocol is one way to achieve that. Private Information Retrieval is a database
technique that uses idea from cryptography to protect the privacy of users by
hiding the details of their queries from the operators of the database. There are
several PIR Protocols but in this thesis the focus is on PIR Protocol which uses
Shamir Secret Sharing Threshold Scheme.
Index Terms:
PIR (Private Information Retrieval), SSS (Shamir Secret Sharing), AWS
(Amazon Web Service)

Abstract
V outsourcingu dat mrak sce´na´rˇ poskytovatel˚u trˇet´ıch stran umozˇnˇuje vy´hody
zpracova´n´ı a znacˇne´ na´klady. V d˚usledku toho je vysoka´ tendence r˚uzny´ch
spolecˇnost´ı zada´vat sve´ u´daje a sluzˇby trˇet´ım poskytovatel˚um sluzˇeb. Na druhe´
straneˇ existuje velke´ obavy, pokud jde o soukromı´ externeˇ dat. Vzhledem k
tomu, v u´lozˇne´m syste´mu u´tok postrann´ım kana´lem je to mozˇne´, mu˚zˇe doj´ıt
k u´niku citlivy´ch informac´ı, outsourcing prˇicha´z´ı s drahou cenu, a tak mus´ıme
vyvinout algoritmy, ktere´ mohou zabra´nit takove´ informace, ktere´ maj´ı by´t
zna´my poskytovateli cloudu. Tyto bezpecˇnostn´ı proble´my jsou zde: sˇkodlive´
zasveˇcenci, data lokalita, nedostatecˇne´ kontrole outsourcovany´ch u´daj˚u, legisla-
tiva ota´zky, dat a dostupnost sluzˇeb, dodavatele lock-in atd. Par Hlavn´ım
c´ılem te´to pra´ce je deˇlat vy´zkum prˇes existuj´ıc´ıch algoritmu˚, ktere´ pouzˇ´ıvaj´ı
cloud computing platforem, aby se zabra´nilo takove´mu u´niku informac´ı a vyvi-
nout a zave´st vhodny´ protokol, ktery´ mu˚zˇe skry´vat takove´ citlive´ informace od
poskytovatel˚u cloudovy´ch. Soukrome´ z´ıska´va´n´ı informac´ı Protocol je jedn´ım
ze zp˚usob˚u, jak dosa´hnout, aby. Soukrome´ z´ıska´va´n´ı informac´ı je databa´ze,
technika, ktera´ vyuzˇ´ıva´ mysˇlenku z kryptografie k ochraneˇ soukromı´ uzˇivatel˚u
t´ım, zˇe skryje podrobnosti o svy´ch dotaz˚u od provozovatel˚u databa´ze. Existuje
neˇkolik PIR Protokoly, ale v te´to pra´ci je pozornost zameˇrˇena na PIR protokol,
ktery´ nese shamirovo sd´ılen´ı tajemstv´ı Threshold Scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of
progress, in every society, in every family.”
Kofi Annan
1.1 Motivation
Since the idea of the Cloud Computing comes into practice everything related
to the usage of internet has become a relief. To illustrate this some examples
are shown. Cloud Computing means computing based on the internet. It allows
you to get your application online, to store your files online. Before the idea of
the cloud, storing your files was much more complex. To do so, firstly, you had
to save them into a personal computer and to take them with you, you would
have to save them into a CD or flash drive. Nowadays, with cloud being part of
our life we can save files only and can access them from anywhere.
Some of the best cloud storage services are Gmail, Google docs., Drobbox,
pCloud. Some of the Cloud Platforms are Windows Azure, Amazon Web Ser-
vices. Later the security algorithms and protocols these platforms are using to
keep the information of their clients safe, will be discussed. Most of the compa-
nies nowadays are moving into cloud and use at least one of the cloud services.
Some of the key points of such an involvement into cloud computing are:
• flexibility
• cost
• complexity of owning and operating computers and networks
• security
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One important topic of the thesis is privacy. When it comes to the cloud,
privacy is one of the most important topics. As the industry of cloud comput-
ing is currently experiencing tremendous growth and each day more business
are using cloud, the need of preventing information leakage is becoming a big
concern for cloud providers.
1.2 Problem Statement
When we upload our data in a cloud service such as Drobbox our data is en-
crypted and then outsourced by a third party. Even if the data is encrypted
we are not entirely safe that our data can not be stolen for some reasons listed
below:
1. Different cloud providers use different encryption algorithms but none of
them is theoretically unbreakable.
2. A cloud storage provider can learn which data is accessed, how often and
what action a client can take.
3. A cloud storage providers can learn who has access to this data or who
accesses the data .
4. Also a cloud storage provider can learn from where the client is accessing
the data and how much data is stored.
The last three points are information that can be revealed by using a side
channel attack, and such side channel exists in a storage system. Such infor-
mation are called meta-data information. So in some scenarios revealing any of
these meta-data information may already be problematic, even if the content
data is unknown.
1.3 Aim of the thesis
The overall aim of the thesis is to find and implement a suitable protocol which
can hide these meta-data information. Then, this portocol is deployed in an
existing cloud platform such as AWS in order to do some performance measure-
ments and see how it works and hide meta-data information.
1.4 Methodological Approach
This thesis consists of two parts: The first part is a theoretical part and the
second part is a practical one.
The first part of the thesis consists of Chapter 2 and 3. In chapter 2 is given
an overview of Cloud and what are the benefits of using Cloud. Later in this
chapter, data beyond privacy techniques used in cloud platforms such as Amazon
Web Service, are discussed. In chapter 3 a mathematical description of Shamir
5
Secret Sharing threshold scheme is given and later in this chapter are described
the current PIR Protocols and their advantages and disadvantages. Since our
work regards on PIR Protocol based on Shamir Secret Sharing an overview of
Galois Field is given, too. Galois Field used in this project is GF(256) and all
mathematical operations are done based on that Finite Field.
The second part of the thesis consists of Chapter 4, 5. In chapter 4 a detailed
description of AWS’s architecture is given. Later, in this chapter the way how
the application is deployed in AWS is showed. In chapter 5, the implementation
details and performance measurements report of the application are given.
1.5 Related Work
In this section several research topics related to this thesis are introduced. We
have divided research papers into three categories:
1. Current Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
2. Current PIR Protocols and their advantages and disadvantages.
3. Enhancement algorithms for PIR Protocol.
Note: PIR Protocol is part of the Privacy Enhancing Technology
(PET).
The aim of PET is to allow users to take actions such as increasing control
over their personal data, using pseudonyms, or anonymous data credentials,
minimize the personal data collected and used by service providers and mer-
chants etc, related to their personal data sent to, and used by, cloud providers.
The papers [25], [26], [27] give us an overview of privacy design strate-
gies which encompass design patterns, data, process-oriented design strategies
and privacy-enhancing technologies. In these papers a structured overview of
important privacy technologies is given. Some of the privacy techniques dis-
cussed here are : Authentication, Secured Private Communication, Privacy in
Database, Communication anonymity and pseudonymity, Private Information
Retrieval. The paper [28] describes an hybrid PIR Protocol which combines
two Pir Protocols one by Goldberg and another one by Aguilar Merchol. It is
shown that this hybrid protocol is particularly beneficial when the number of
records in a database is large compared to the size of the records and uses less
communication than either of these component protocols. In this paper [29]
a simple PIR scheme of Chor et al and Goldberg is described. The protocol
implemented here is almost the same as Goldberg with the only change to the
client side of Goldberg’s 2007 Byzantine-robust in order to improve its Byzan-
tine robustness from to, which is the theoretically maximum possible value.
This protocol according to the taken measurements seems to be faster than the
original Goldberg protocol. This was achieved by using decoding algorithms
that are able to take advantage of decoding information in multiple blocks of
data simultaneously, especially in scenarios when a client is interested in more
than one block at a time.
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In this paper [30] the robustness of private information retrieval is improved
in several ways. In section 5 an enhancement of PIR Protocol based on Shamir
Secret Sharing is shown and the result is that after independence to the protocol
is added but neither the communication cost ,nor the number of servers, is
increased.
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Chapter 2
Privacy and Security in
Cloud Computing
2.1 Introduction
Not many years ago people used to carry their files on floppy disks. Then later
they switched to flash drives. Nowadays, we are in a new era, in the era of cloud
computing. Cloud computing is the distribution of on-demand computing re-
sources including everything from data centers to applications over the internet.
Cloud computing enables us to have access on the information stored in remote
servers and then manipulate it by using any device which has access over the
internet, such as computers, personal computers and smartphones.
A lot of people have doubts about the advantage of saving our data in
cloud. Firstly, you can access your files, projects from everywhere, from your
computer at work or from your personal computer at home. Secondly, if you
are an employee of IT department, cloud makes computing easier. On the
other hand, the usage of dedicated servers brought a lot of problems like, cost,
crashing, installation, maintenance, and full with viruses. Furthermore, what
cloud computing does, is to take care of all these problems. To sum up, cloud
computing reduces the cost, and the amount of work for IT employees. Cloud
takes the service, technology and applications that are similar to those on the
internet, and turns them into a self-service benefit.
So, due to the facilites cloud is bringing to us, nowadays, cloud is becoming
a solution for small and big companies and also for individual customers. The
revolution that cloud computing brought is that with internet we can access any
resource that we need to.
As mentioned above the reduction of cost is as a result of sharing of storage
resources and computing among the cloud’s clients. On the other hand, this
brings up issues of traditional security, privacy mechanisms and trust. Since
the thesis is more concerned about privacy rather than security, in this chapter
will be discussed the privacy mechanisms which are used in Amazon Web Service
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(AWS).
Privacy here, will be referred to as the individuals have the right to ‘know
what is known about them’, control how that information is given, be conscious
of stored information about them and prevent its abuse. In other words, privacy
is more than just confidentiality of information. Every individual has the right
to control his or her own data, whether public, private or professional. In the
online world, privacy concerns are increasingly important, especially in a cloud
scenario.
The main reason why the privacy is a big concern in a cloud scenario is
because the end-users consume cloud services with no information about the
involved processes. This comes as a result of unknowing where the data centers
are physically located or how the personal data, which will be processed, is
configured. Since the cloud is a distributed system and anyone with an account
can access the data stored in the cloud, data which is stored in data centers
is more difficult to control and easier to be manipulated. Storing sensitive
data on a data center somewhere in cyberspace could be a major threat to
individual privacy. Thus a lot of questions related to the cloud security and
privacy are raised. How relieable are cloud data centers? Can we trust our
sensitive information to cloud providers? What happens if data gets lost?
In this chapter a detailed description of what are the ways to protect the
privacy of individuals is showed. For that, in the upcoming sections, there are
given detailed examples of some of the most usable PET algorithms. Also, it
is explained how Amazon Web Service deployed those algorithms in order to
protect the privacy of their clients and to make their environment trustworthy.
2.2 Cloud Computing
It is very important to have a clear idea of what cloud is and how it works
before moving on and discussing the privacy algorithms which are deployed
in AWS and Microsoft Azure cloud platforms. Moreover, the practical work
consists of deploying the application in AWS, so a deep understanding of the
cloud enviroment itself is required.
There is no single common definition of what cloud is. According to National
Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), the cloud computing is defined
as follows [4] :
”Cloud computing is a model which enables suitable, on-demand network ac-
cess to a shared pool of resources configurable computing resources (e.g.,services,
networks, data centers, applications and storage) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.
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Figure 2.1: Cloud Computing architecture. Image retrieved from [10]
2.2.1 Main Characteristics
Cloud computing is defined by the following characteristics:
1. Broad network access
2. Resource pooling
3. On-demand self-service
4. Rapid elasticity
5. Measured service
Broad network access means that in order to promote use and facilitate ac-
cess through heterogeneous thick or thin client platforms (e.g., laptops, tablets,
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workstations and mobile phones ), capabilites over the network and accessed
through standard mechanisms are available. [4]
Resource pooling is about pooling the provider’s computing resources in or-
der to serve to multiple clients by using a multi-tenant model with different
virtual and physical resources which according to the client request are dynam-
ically assigned and reassigned [4]. Generally the clients have no knowledge
of where exactly the provided resources are physically located, but the client
may specify preferences such as countries or states for data centers in different
locations.
On-demand self-service means that physical servers and network storages can
be configured and ordered automatically and do not require human interaction
with each service provider. [4] In contrast, in the old provisioning model the
physical servers had to be configured before being used.
Rapid elasticity is a cloud computing term and it refers to the ability to pro-
vide scalable services. Clients are allowed to automatically request additional
space in the cloud or other types of services. Even though the providers usually
need to allocate and de-allocate resources, this is irrelevant to the client side.
This is a crucial aspect of cloud technology because it means that cloud com-
puting resources are unlimited and automatically available. This is in contrast
to the older systems, where the limited storage and memory were visible to the
user. [4]
Measured service is a cloud computing term and it is used as a service
reference by the cloud providers in order to measure or monitor the provision
of services for different reasons, including effective use of resources, billing, or
overall predictive planning. According to NIST, a measured service is a setup
where cloud systems may control a user or tenant’s use of resources by leveraging
a metering capability somewhere in the system. [4]
2.2.2 The service models
The following three service models in cloud computing are generally well-known.
All of these service models allow users to run applications and store data online.
Each of them offers a different level of user control and flexibility.
1. Software as a Service (SaaS)
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS)
3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
Additionally, in recent years another service model, which is called Anything
as a Service(XaaS), has been considered as a fourth service model. [6]
Software as a Service(SaaS). This service model allows the client to use
the cloud provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The client
11
Figure 2.2: Cloud service models. Image retrieved from [7]
can access the applications provided by cloud administrator by using a web
browser or a program interface. The client can not control or manage the cloud
infrastructure including servers, storage, network, operating systems, or even
individual application capabilities. It is allowed for a client only to control or
monitor the limited user- specific application configuration settings. [4]
The benefits of using SaaS are :
1. Accessible from any computer
2. Free or paid via subscription
3. Facilitates collaborative working
Platform as a Service (PaaS). PaaS expands the benefits that SaaS in
the cloud brought to the end-user. In basic terms, PaaS allows users to create
their own cloud applications by providing environments and tools to them.
The benefits of using PaaS are the following:
1. Public or private deployment
2. Rapid development at low cost
3. Facilitates collaborative working
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). IaaS expands the idea introduced
in PaaS. In basic terms, IaaS is a third-party provider that hosts software,
hardware, storage and other infrastructure components on behalf of its users
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and also handles tasks, including system maintenance and backup, for its users.
We just need to rent the services we need to use by third-party providers. For
instance if we need a database server we just rent the service and do not need
to worry about the hardware, security and infrastructure.
The benefits of using IaaS are the following:
1. Cost of bandwith has gone down tremendously
2. Scalable and flexible
3. Increased infrastructure reliability
Anything as a Service (XaaS). The main idea is to expand the basic ser-
vice models by making everything and anything virtually and available as a ser-
vice in the cloud. Aside from the three well-known service models listed above, a
number of additional models have been established [6]. Such as, Collaboration-
as-a-Service, Business Process-as-a-Service,Database-as-a-Service, Strategy-as-
a-Service, Network-as-a-Service and Communicationas- a-Service. The last two
entries, Network-as-a-Service and Communication-as-a-Service, have been rec-
ognized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as part of the
cloud computing service models.
2.2.3 Deployment models
The following deployment models are defined by where the infrastructure of the
deployment exists. According to NIST [4] there are four types of deployment
models in cloud computing
1. Public cloud
2. Private cloud
3. Hybrid cloud
4. Community cloud
Public cloud. In this kind of deployment model there are cloud servers
that are entirely hosted by external providers such as Amazon, Digital Ocean,
Windows Azure. These services exist to allow clients to scale up their applica-
tions, to spin up resources on demand. In this way, the client is in charge of
only administrating the server and application. The physical hardware, resource
allocation and networking are all handled by the provider [11]. For instance, if
the network goes down or if the server gets crashed the third-party provider is
in charge of handling these problems. The benefits of using public cloud are :
13
Figure 2.3: Cloud service models. Image retrieved from [13]
1. Easily accessible
2. Offer increased availabilty and scale
3. Cost savings are often passed on to clients
The availability and scalability are the main advantages of using public cloud.
For instance, in AWS there are teams which are focused primarly on physical
servers so that the clients do not have to worry about that. They can just focus
on building their applications in deploying into the cloud.
On the other hand, there are also some downsides of using public cloud as
listed below:
1. Some services, which are not supported by the provider, need to be built
by the clients
2. They are dependent on the uptime and quality of the third-party provider
3. There are only a few guarantees on physical security
Private cloud. They are managed and maintained by the company itself.
For example, if different organizations want to set up their own private cloud,
they would essentially create their own servers and have their own physical
hardware servers. They make resources available only internally, so that their
applications can be deployed to their own physical controlled servers. They do
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not have to go to AWS or Windows Azure, they can actually setup their own
infrastructure. [11] Because of the benefits listed below, the private cloud is
gaining high popularity.
1. It can ensure physical security
2. It has more monitoring
3. It has more control over hardware
The main benefit of private cloud is the control over security . If you have
your own private cloud, you can control it when the servers are getting updated.
Based on the application, this control is tremendously important.
Besides the benefits, there are also some other things we need to consider if
we want to build our own private cloud. Training and expertise are needed. For
instance, we need server administrators, networking specialists. That means
that your costs will be higher and also responsibility will be increased. Now, if
a server goes down, you will not rely anymore on a support contract, but you
need to take your own responsibility and fix the problem.
Hybrid cloud. It comes as a combination of public and private cloud. This
type of deployment model is going to be the dominant model in the near future.
The main reason is that it allows the flexibility and control when it is needed,
but on the other hand, it also takes the benefits of public cloud, such as cost
savings, scalability and availability.
Essentially, in this case we have a public cloud and a private cloud which
will communicate through some agreed protocols whether it is through sockets
or Rest API. In this scenario, we will have our private cloud data which may
hold our secured data and then, for the client part, like for advertising or order
processing, those will be out to the public cloud.
Community cloud. This type of model is the rarest and the least known
out of the other models. Essentially, it is a private cloud with several organi-
zations. The cloud infrastructure is owned and shared between these organiza-
tions. The organizations could be companies working together, governmental
organizations or research groups. Let’s suppose there are three companies which
will work together in a project. In that case, they will set up their own cloud
and will share resources among them.
2.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of using cloud
The reason why companies and organizations are moving toward cloud is be-
cause cloud computing offers us some advantages as followings:
Mobility Cloud gives us the opportunity to work anytime, anywhere. It is
not neccessary to go and work from your office.
15
Scalability Cloud gives us the opportunity to quickly build, deploy and man-
age our applications. Moreover, it enables us to build and expand within min-
utes.
Software updates All updates and maintenace will be carried out by the
third-party providers.
Flexibility Depending on workload, the resources can be increased or de-
creased.
Collaboration Employees can get synchronized between them and work
wherever they are.
Cost is reduced Now you can pay based on consumption. Payments can be
paid monthly or annually.
Environmentally friendly Less hardware is required. Moreover it reduces
energy consumption and carbon footprint.
Besides the advantages cloud offers to us there are also some downsides, we
need to worry about when we use cloud. [15]
Security and Privacy In a cloud environment we usually save a lot of data,
sometimes also sensitive data. In any discussion about data, privacy and se-
curity must be the most important concern. When we sign up in order to use
the resources the third-party provider offers to us, we do not have any informa-
tion where our data will be saved and who will control them. This makes the
cloud environment unreliable. In order to convince the clients, the third-party
providers are currently deploying the most sophisticated protocol to protect the
client’s data.
Downtime No cloud providers can assure us immunity to service outages.Cloud
computing systems are internet based, which means that our access is depen-
dent on our Internet connection. Like every type of hardware, cloud platforms
themselves can fail for any reason.
Vulnerable to attack In a cloud platform every component of cloud is ac-
cessible by the Internet. Everything which is connected to the Internet is not
secured. For that reason, even the best teams suffer severe attacks and security
breeches.
2.3 Privacy techniques in Amazon Web Service
In this section, the privacy techniques will be discussed. Privacy is a very im-
portant concept when it comes to the Internet. Privacy is a fundamental human
right. There is a massive power imbalance between data processing and the in-
dividuals whose data is at stake. So, in a digital world the protection of private
data plays a crucial role. Many users while they are using a specific service
are usually unaware of the data processing and its consequences. Moreover, the
users do not have such information of what is happening to their data and that
the control they have to their own data is limited. Lastly, even the penalties for
infringements of legal protection of your data take effect after a breach or data
misuse has already occured.
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”Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)” is a term which was introduced for
a category of technologies that minimise the processing of personal data. Using
PET will decrease the risk of the user’s informational privacy. Also, the legal
data protection for the data processing of some responsible entities would be
more easily fulfilled.
According to [16] the privacy techniques which are used and implemented
in the world of internet, the followings can be mentioned:
1. Authentication
2. Attribute based credentials
3. Secure private communications
4. Communications anonymity and pseudonymity
5. Storage privacy
6. Private information Retrieval
The information about privacy techniques deployed in Amazon Web Service
and Microsot Azure is limited. Finding the proper information about the au-
thentication and the attribute based credentials was not an easy task. There are
different authentication techniques used by cloud providers as listed below:
1. Multi-factor Authentication
2. Public Key Infrastructure
3. Username and password
4. Single sign-on
5. Mobile Trusted Module
6. Biometric Authentication
2.3.1 Amazon Web Services(AWS)
AWS together with MA are the best-known cloud platforms in the world. In
chapter 4, I have described how the application in AWS is deployed. Moreover,
in chapter 4 is described how AWS works, how to create and manage the EC2
instances, how to upload the files in a bucket (S3 Storage) and how to connect
EC2 instances with S3 Storages. For that reason in this section, an overview of
AWS is given.
AWS platform is based on the concept of ”Pay-As-You-Go”. AWS has a
bunch of services which clients can use when it is required, without any long
term commitment. It enables clients to use services, such as computing,
database storage, networking and programming models.
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Moreover, Amazon offers a free usage of AWS cloud platforms for its cos-
tumers, for a year. After the expiration of a free usage tier, you are required to
”Pay-As-You-Go”. Amazon as a free usage tier offers the following:
1. Amazon EC2 virtual server to resize computing capacity in the cloud, with
750 hours per month.
2. Amazon S3 storage infrastructure with standard storage of 5 GB facilitat-
ing 2.000 Put Requests and 20.000 Get Requests.
3. Amazon DynamoDB with 25 units each of Read and Write capacity and
a stoarage of 25GB.
4. AWS IoT, device to cloud connector, which can deliver 250.000 messages
each month.
5. Amazon EC2 Container.
Regions and Availability zones AWS is made up of regions which are a
grouping of independetly seperated data centers in a specific region known as
”Availability zones”. It is important to note that different regions have different
prices for their services. There are 6 AWS regions as listed below:
1. Europe(Dublin)
2. US East(Northern Virginia)
3. US West(Northern California)
4. Asia Pacific(Tokyo)
5. Asia Pacific(Singapore)
6. GovCloud(West Coast)
Availability zones work together in a region to make up a collection of our
AWS resources. Availability of regions allows the architect to design applications
to conform to specific regulations and laws for a particular part of the world.
Viewing a region in the console means that you will only view resources in one
region at a time. There are some AWS services which will work globally, not
only in a particular region. One example, is the users created in IAM.
Use cases AWS can be used in several occasions.
Manufacturing Organization can use AWS to extend its business through
quality production while leaving IT Management to AWS.
Media Company can use AWS in order to provide different types of content,
such as audio files and videos.
Architecture consulting company can use AWS to get high-compute of con-
struction prototypes.
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Figure 2.4: AWS architecture. Image retrieved from [14]
Accessing AWS can be done in 5 different ways in order to create and
manage our applications.
AWS Command Line Interface which refers to a command line tool. This
tool operates through commands for managing and automating our AWS ser-
vices.
AWS Management Console which refers to a web interface.
Command Line Tools which operates through commands in order to manage
our individual products.
Query API refers to low-level API accessible through HTTP requests.
AWS Software Development Kits(SDKs) refers to application programing
interface or API specific to our programming platform.
AWS services are grouped together by ”type”. AWS are grouped in the
following categories:
1. Storage
2. Database Services
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3. Compute and Networking
4. App Services
5. Management Services
6. Deployment Services
7. Analytics
A properly architected application will make use of multiple types of services
as it is shown in Fig 1.4.
Privacy and Security in AWS
Security
AWS provides data security by using network architecture which helps us
meet security related objectives, such as: Alertness, Visibility, Auditability,
Manageability. Information related to the security, AWS delivers to clients by
using different mediums (e.g, papers, certifications, reports, Third-party Attes-
tations). This kind of information plays a crucial role by giving the clients the
neccessary information about AWS security controls and how the third-party
provider would validate these controls.
When it comes to the security, AWS offers its customers security benefits by
ensuring them with a robust safety mechanism. The security managers which
are hired by AWS, review and verify the components on the daily basis. AWS
offers to its clients an online tool called Trusted Advisor which identifies security
gaps and fills them. AWS uses different security tools in order to secure clients
data. The key features of these security tools are the followings:
• Provide data encryption and build-in network firewalls
• By using tools as Amazon Inspectors it evaluates applications for weakness
or deviations.
• By using AWS Identity and Access Management, and AWS Mulit-Factor
Authentication it defines hardware-based authenticators and user account
permissions.
• Maintain and monitor logs of access and changes at the customer’s AWS
environment.
AWS implements a share responsible model to ensure the security of data
and its products and services. It provides multiple data protection services, such
as: encryption, security groups and multi-factor authentication capabilities.
Datacenters are a crucial component of AWS. It is very important to keep
them physically secured. To achieve that, AWS undertakes the following key
measures:
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• Implements two factor authentication
• Allows only individuals with approved and authorized access
• Provides non-stop monitoring and auditing of physical access controls
• Deploys training security guards
AWS uses monitoring tools in order to provide security for all products.
These tools monitor: Applications, usage of network and server, port scanning
activities and unauthorized attempts. Moreover, AWS uses some tools in order
to protect the entire environment. The key measures implemented by this tools
include, SSL for encrypted transmission over HTTP, only users with crypto-
graphic keys and certificates can access an AWS API and offer data encryption
of files and objects stored using AWS services (e.g, Amazon RedShift, Amazon
Glacier, and others).
Privacy
In [39] is described in details how protection mechanisms works in AWS.
Some of these mechanisms are listed below:
• AWS Account security features
• AWS Overall authentication
1. AWS Account Security Features AWS provides a variety of tools
and features that you can use to keep your resources and AWS account
safe from unauthorized use. This includes credentials for access control,
the creation of separate IAM user accounts, HTTPS endpoints for en-
crypted data transmission, user activity logging for security monitoring,
and Trusted Advisor security checks [39]. The table below highlights
various AWS credentials.
2. AWS Overall authentication The authentication is a process which
gives individual access to the system based on credetentials the client
provides to authenticate. In AWS platform authentication process and
steps to follow are described in details on [40].
The corresponding steps of authentication process for the clients are given
below:
• If you do not have an Amazon account you must create one or if you
have one just log in (note: This is just a regular Amazon.com login)
• To have access and to use your product you have to sign up
• Download your product
• Downloading the product requires an activation key
• Activate your product by using this activation key
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Credential Type Use Description
Access keys Digitally signed requests
to AWS APIs(using
CLI,AWS SDK)
Includes a secret access key and
an access key ID. You use these
keys to digitally sign program-
matic requests that you make to
AWS.
Key pairs
(a) CloudFront signed
URLs
(b) SSH login to EC2 in-
stances
A key pair(AWS use 1024 bit
SSH-2 RSA keys )is required
to connect to an EC2 instance
launched from a public AMI. You
can upload your own key pair or
you can have a key pair gener-
ated automatically for you when
you launch the instance
Passwords IAM user account or AWS
root account (is a web ser-
vice that assists you se-
curely control access to
AWS resources for your
users) login to the AWS
Management Console
A string of characters provided
for logging into your AWS ac-
count or IAM account. AWS
passwords must be a minimum
of 6 characters and may be up
to 128 characters
MFA(multi factor
authentication)
IAM user account or AWS
root account or login to
the AWS Management
Console
It is required in additon to your
password in order to log in into
your AWS account or IAM ac-
count. It is 6 characters long
X.509 certificates
(a) SSL server certifi-
cates for HTTPS
(b) Digitally signed
SOAP requests to
AWS APIs
They are used only for the pur-
pose of signing SOAP-based re-
quests. You can upload your own
certificate by using Security Cre-
dentials page
Table 2.1: Credentials types and their use in AWS platform
• The client downloads and installs your product
• During installation, or just after installation, the product, as it is
shown in Fig 1.5, goes through an activation process. After the prod-
uct obtains the activation key from the client, your product sends an
inquiry to the license service to activate itself and obtains an access
key ID , secret access key and user token for the customer. Your
inquiry involves the product token for your product and the client’s
activation key. The product appropriately saves the credentials it has
received, so the client can use the product seamlessly in the future.
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Figure 2.5: Authentication mechanism in AWS platform. Image taken on [12]
Access key ID is a string of 20 characters and Secret Access key is a
string of 40 characters.
• Later, when the client uses the product, it makes an Amazon S3
REST request on behalf of the client. In the process, the product
reclaims and uses the access key ID, secret access key, user token
and the product token for the product. Amazon S3 requests that use
DevPay must be REST requests. SOAP requests are not supported
for DevPay.
There are several other privacy techniques which AWS platform has im-
plemented in order to protect the privacy of their costumers. However,
despite the attempts Amazon has done to make its environment entirely
safe, is a fact that no system which can be accessed over the internet is
entirely safe. For that reason, security and privacy of each cloud plat-
form, including AWS, is counted more as a disadvantage rather than an
advantage.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, is done an overview of what cloud computing is. Cloud’s model
services and its deployment models are described. Later, the advantages and
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disadvantages of using cloud computing are discussed. The main conclusion
from this chapter is that cloud computing is becoming very popular nowadays
and it is affordable in terms of money. Also easily can be pointed out that the
main concern is security and privacy of cloud platforms. In the last section of
this chapter, are described some of the privacy techniques, such as authenti-
cation in real word scenarios, like Windows Azure and Amazon Web Service
cloud platforms. Since there are a lot of highly secured authentication proto-
cols implemented and deployed to the existing cloud platforms, I decided to
dedicate my work to another privacy technique, such as private information re-
trieval. According to the searching over the internet, there is no single cloud
system which has implemented and deployed PIR protocol and that gives me
more motivation to work toward this topic.
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Chapter 3
Data Beyond Privacy
3.1 Introduction
With the advance of technology, the internet has become a widespread techno-
logical tool used for various purposes. It has been reported that the number
of internet users has increased from 738 million in 2000 to 3.2 billion today.
It means that the internet traffic is very dense and each day it continues to
expand. By internet traffic we understand data which flows over the internet.
Every internet user in his daily basis uploads and downloads data from the in-
ternet. Data is our most valuable asset. It is so important to keep our data
safe over the internet, especially in the case of sensitive data. In the last decade
there have been a lot of cases with data breach. In terms of money it costs a
lot.
According to this report [24], in 2014 happened the largest hack of all
the time. Yahoo confirmed that about 500 million user account credentials have
been stolen. The stolen data include email addresses, names, telephone numbers,
hashed passwords and birthdays. It cost Yahoo a lot of money. According to
some reports, this breach could have implications for the 4.8 billion sale of Yahoo
to Verizon. This case was even larger than the case of Myspace breach of 427
million password and 360 million user accounts. There are a dozen of other
cases in which data breach has occurred.
As previously stated, no system which can be accessed by internet, is 100 %
safe. Cloud computing, because of the advantages it offers to the organisations,
is becoming each day more popular. However, a lot of organisations are afraid
to trust their data to a third-party provider. Despite of the high-level security,
privacy algorithms cloud platforms have deployed in their cloud environment,
the cloud platforms are not entirely a safe environment.
In this chapter are discussed privacy aspects which go beyond data privacy.
Even if the shared information during the transmission is encrypted, other sen-
sitive information may be revealed to an unauthorized user. Such information
contains the identities of sender and receiver, how often the communication be-
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tween two parties is done, when the communication starts and the message size.
In many situations, revealing any of these information may be problematic, even
if the content of the data is encrypted.
In a storage system such side channels exist. A third-party provider can
reveal relevant information. For instance, the information may contain who
accesses the data, who has access to the data, from where the data is accessed
and how often data is accessed. Moreover, the third-party provider may reveal
how much data are stored. By using these side channels, third-party provider
can learn the access history. The access history may reveal user’s habits and
preferences. Possessing information about the access frequency of files stored in
a cloud platform may lead to the individual data revealing.
In this chapter the focus is mainly on the privacy algorithms which help
us hide information to the third-party provider about which data is accessed,
how often data is accessed and what action the customer is performing. One
of these privacy algorithms is Private Information Retrieval. For readers who
are interested in this topic and want to know more about privacy aspects, we
suggest them to look in [57]
3.2 Secret-Sharing Schemes
To undertand the importance of threshold schemes, let’s take a simple prob-
lem: 6 detectives are working on a secret project. They want to lock up their
documents in a safe box. Safe box can only be opened if and only if 3 or more
of the detectives are present. What is the minimum number of the detective’s
combination in order to open the safe box? What is the minimum number
for a particular detective to form a group of 3 detectives? The answer for the
first question is 20 and for the second question is 10. So, even for a case with
small number of detectives, the minimum number of combinations of detectives
needed to reveal the secret is large. Therefore, the objective of developing an
efficient secret sharing scheme is to find out one mechanism through which you
can divide the secret amongst n participants, such that, if t of them combine,
they will be able to find the secret. The scheme should be efficient, which
means that the number of combinations should be small. It means that the
computational over it should be as minimal as possible.
Secret-sharing schemes are a tool used in many cryptographic protocols. It is
an important tool for storage systems. It protects the system against destruction
and data leakage. In [58], a survey about existance of secret sharing schemes
is done. This survey includes the most relevant constructions of secret-sharing
schemes, discussion about the known lower bounds on the share size, two results
for connecting secret-sharing schemes for a Hamiltonian structure to an open
problem in cryptography.
Shamir [48] and Blakley [59], were the first ones that introduced secret-
sharing schemes for the threshold case (n,t). In this threshold case, the secret is
divided into n parts, giving each participant a unique part. Then, to reconstruct
it, at least t parts, or all of them are needed. Shamir’s threshold scheme is more
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Figure 3.1: Blakley’s scheme using three dimensions: A plane represents a share.
The point in which three shares intersect, is the secret. Image taken from
Wikipedia.
efficient than Blakley’s in terms of the share size. In Shamir’s scheme the shares
are only as large as the original secret, whereas in Blakley’s scheme the shares
are k times bigger than the original secret. Figure 1.1 visualizes Blakley’s secret
sharing scheme where 3 non-parallel hyperplanes intersect to reveal the secret.
Shamir’s scheme has two major problems: to keep all shares, large storage
is required and heavy computational cost is needed. To overcome the first
problem, ramp secret sharing schemes have been proposed [66]. To overcome
the second problem Ishizu et al. introduced a fast threshold scheme (3,2) in
[52]. Fuji et al. generalized Ishizu’s scheme for n number of participants (n,2) in
[64]. These schemes, in order to create shares and then reconstruct the secret
from two or more shares, use only XOR operations. XOR operations enable
them fast computational. Secret Sharing schemes for general access structures
were presented by Saito, Ito, and Nishizeki [20]. More efficient schemes were
introduced in, e.g., [ [62], [63]].
3.2.1 Shamir Secret Sharing Threshold Scheme(SSS): Math-
ematical description
Adi Shamir presented a method for sharing a secret. He suggested taking the
secret S and to divide it amongst n participiants. Furthermore, the secret S
can be easily reconstructed only if we have t < n pieces. The knowledge of
t-1 pieces, makes the secret S undetermined. This is called a (n,t) threshold
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scheme.
The scheme relies on the idea that you can fit a unique polynomial of degree
(t-1) to any set of t points that lie on the polynomial. It takes two points to
define a straight line, three points to fully define a quadratic, four points to
define a cubic curve, and so on.
In a nutshell, the essential idea of SSS threshold scheme is that 2 points define
e polynomial of degree 1, 3 points define a polynomial of degree 2 and 4 points
can define a polynomial of degree 3. In general t points define a polynomial of
degree t-1.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme. With SSS threshold
Figure 3.2: Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
scheme a solution to two problems is given. The key can be distributed to
different users, and each user will keep his/her secret. Moreover, the user by
knowing only his/her shares still can not recover the secret. Secondly, the
intruder might compromise different user’s shares, but the secret generated from
SSS threshold scheme will be very difficult to be obtained. SSS is based on
polynomial interpolation. It is very important to understand the Lagrange
interpolation since it is used in the second phase of SSS, when the secret is
recovered.
Lagrange Interpolation
Lagrange polynomials are used for polynomial interpolation. If somebody
gives us three data points and if we draw a polynomial through these data
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points, it will be a second-order polynomial.
Theorem: Given (k+1) data points as (x0, y0), (x1, y1), ....., (xk, yk) where x0
6= x1 6= ... 6= xk. Then, k-th order polynomial is given as : fk(x)=
k∑
i=0
Li(x)f(xi),
where f(xi)=yi and weighting function Li(x) =
k∏
j=0,j 6=i
x−xj
xi−xj =
x−x0
xi−x0
x−x1
xi−x1 ....
x−xi−1
xi−xi−1
x−xi+1
xi−xi+1 ....
x−xk
xi−xk
Example: Define 2−order ploynomial, f(x) when these data points are given:
(x0, y0) = (2, 10), (x1, y1) = (4, 16), (x2, y2) = (5, 20). To define a polynomial
of degree k − 1, it takes k point.
Firstly, let’s calculate the weighting function Li(x).
L0 = x−x1x0−x1
x−x2
x0−x2 =
1
6 x
2 − 32 x + 103
L1 = x−x0x1−x0
x−x2
x1−x2 =
−1
2 x
2 + 72 x − 5
L2 = x−x0x2−x0
x−x1
x2−x1 =
1
3 x
2 − 2 x + 83
Therefore
f(x)=
2∑
i=0
Li(x)f(xi) = 13 x2 + x +
20
3
How does Shamir Secret Sharing works?
The scheme passes into two steps: sharing the secret and then, recover it.
Example:
First step (Sharing the secret):
Suppose the secret is 3 (S = 3). The secret is divided into 6 parts (n = 6)
where any combination of 3 parts (k = 3) is sufficient to recover the secret.
The polynomial will be the degree of 2 and the two other coefficients are chosen
randomly. Let them be a = 2 and b = 1.
The polynomial will be on the form: y = ax2+bx+c. After substitution
the polynomial will be: y = 2x2+x+3. Figure 3.4 represents the graph of
thw polynomial. Six pairs (x, fx) from the polynomial are constructed : (1, 6),
(2, 13), (3, 24), (4, 39), (5, 58), (6, 81) . Each participant will receive a single
different pair. It is important to note that we do not use here pair (0, f0) since
it will give us the secret.
Second step (Reconstruction):
Now that the shares and the threshold scheme (6,3) are available, the secret
can be reconstructed. In order to recover the secret any three combination of 3
pairs are enough. Let it takes the first three shares (x0, y0) = (1, 6) (x1, y1) =
(2, 13) (x3, y3) = (3, 24). The Lagrange basis polynomials is computed as it is
done in the example above. After some calculations based on the formula above
the weighting functions are as below:
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Figure 3.3: Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
L0 = 12x2 − 52x + 3
L1 = −x2 + 4x − 3
L2 = 12x2 − 32x + 1
After applying formula y=
k∑
i=0
Li(x)f(xi) = 2x2+x+3. Recall that the secret
is the free coefficient of the polynomial, so S=3 and that is.
It is important to note that in order to have an efficient computation of the
polynomial in a certain point, Horner’s rule is being considered. I will discuss
about Horner’s rule in Chapter 4. Also, the aim of polynomial interpolation is
to find a constant in a source polynomial S=f(0). Since unused constants are
calculated using Lagrange interpolation as we have used above, it is not efficient.
Another problem is a security problem. With all pairs you find, you find a lot
of information about the secret. Here [18], you can find a detailed explanation
of this security problem. To avoid that problem, a finite field arithmetic in a field
of size p is used. This prime p should be bigger than the number of participants
and any coefficient of the polynomial including the secret. Instead of calculating
(x, f(x)) calculate (x, f(x)mod(p)). In the thesis I decide to work with Galoa
Field (256) as it offers us the best performance. Thus, it is important to take a
look and explain how GF(256) works.
3.2.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable secret sharing is a protocol in which a dealer or a processor selects
and encrypts a ”secret” and delivers a ”share” of s to each of n participants or
processors. The efficiency of VSS schemes is based on two criterias
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1. The numbers of bits which must be communicated between participants.
2. The required round numbers of communication.
The aim of verifiable secret sharing schemes (VSS) is to verify the consistency
of the shares during both phases, the sharing and the reconstruction [55] .
The first version of VSS was presented in [65]. This version assumes that the
channels are secure and private. It is unconditionally secure only when t < n3 .
In [50] the authors assume that broadcast channels exist on the top of private
secure channels. It only requires t ≤ n2 . The first version has a probability of
error equal to 0 while the second one has a negligible probability of error.
Feldman [61] and Pedersen [68] have proposed new versions of VSS. The
schemes proposed by Feldman and Pedersen are based on homomorphic func-
tions. These functions are hard to invert and is also hard to compute discrete
logarithms over prime fields, Zp.
The protocol proposed by Feldman [61], is a non-interactive scheme VSS
and consists of the following phases
1. Sharing phase In this phase each participant Pi gets a different non-zero
element ei ∈ Zp. Let S be the secret in Zp. This phase consists of three
steps.
• The dealer chooses a random polynomial f(x) of degree k over the
finite field Zp, where f(0) = S
• Dealer computes each share si and transmits it to the participant Pi
• The dealer broadcasts the values gej , where g is a primitive element
in Zp, for j = 0...k with f(x) =
k∑
j=0
ejx
j
2. Detection phase It consists of two phases.
• Using this equation gsi =
k∏
j=0
Aeijj , each participant validates the
share. In cases when share fulfilles that equation, the share is valid,
otherwise Pi broadcasts an accusation to the dealer.
• The dealer D is said to be corrupted when the number of accusations
broadcasted to the dealer is higher than threshold k.
3. Reconstruction phase It consists of three steps:
• Each participant Pi broadcasts f(ei)
• Take k+1 broadcast values for which the equation in phase 2 is ful-
filled.
• Output f(0)
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The protocol proposed by Pedersen [68], is also non-interactive scheme
VSS. In his paper he extended Shamir secret sharing protcol with a verification
protocol, VP, so any group of k participants, who honestly have accepted their
shares in VP, can find the secret s. VP must satisfy the following requirements:
• In the cases when the dealer and Pi both follow VP and the dealer follows
the distribution protocol , then Pi accepts with probability 1
• For all subsets S1 and S2 of (1,. . . , n) of size k such that all parties (Pi)
i ∈ s1, and (Pi) i ∈ s2, have accepted their shares in VP the following
holds except with negligible probability in q: If si is the secret computed
by the participants in Si (for i = 1,2) then s1 = s2.
If a share is accepted by VP, it is called a correct share. The requirements
above guarantee that the dealer almost any time he will try to cheat, he will be
caught.
Using secret sharing schemes, there are cases when the dealer can not be
trusted. The dealer can transmit corrupted shares from which the participants
are not able to recover the secret. Shamir, in his paper did not assume these
cases. In contrast, VSS assumes that there are cases when the dealer can not
be trusted. This means that VSS is not only useful against adversaries, but can
also be vital for detecting errors during transmission of the shares. Moreover,
VSS assumes that only authorized groups of participants can learn the secret.
The honest participants can learn the secret even if the shares and dealer are
corrupted by an adversary.
Before VSS, all previous schemes have been interactive. In one interactive
scheme, the involvment of participants is needed since they exchange messages
in order to prove the correctness of the shares. VSS schemes can be interac-
tive, but also can be non-interactive. Non-interactive scheme, unlike interactive
scheme does not involve the exchange of the messages between participants since
the shares can prove its own validity. Moreover, VSS scheme can also be pub-
licly. In this scenario, anybody not only participants themselves can verify that
participants received the correct shares.
3.3 Finite Fields
I decide that my application uses SSS. As previously stated that a security
problem exists in SSS threshold scheme, if a finite field is not used. In the
thesis GF(28) is used because, mathematical operations on that field can be
performed faster than in any other finite field. A Finite Field which can be
found in different texts also as a Galois Field, has a finite number of elements.
There are 4 basic mathematical operations, which we can apply to elements of
the finite field like: addition, subtraction, multiplication and inversion. [41] An
additive and multiplicative group is required to have the four basic operations
on a field. Group is a set of elements G together with an operation which
combines two elements of G.
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A Finite Field F is a set of elements with the following properties:
• All elements of field F form an additive group with the following operation
“+” and neutral element “0”.
• All elements of field F form a multiplicative group with the following
operation “x” and neutral element “1”.
• When addition and multiplication group operations are both applied, the
distributive law takes place : a(b+ c) = ab+ bc.
Order is the number of elements in a field. A finite field with order q only
exists if q is a prime power, i.e., q = (rp), for some positive integers p and
prime integers r. Finite Fields are divided in two types: prime (order) fields
and extension fields. Prime fields have the p = 1. Elements of the field GF(r)
can be represented by integers from 0 to r − 1. The two operations of the field
are modular integer addition and integer multiplication modulo p.
In extension fields we can not apply the addition and multiplication in the
same way as addition and multiplication of integer modulo. The elements of
extension fields are represented as polynomials. The polynomials have a degree
of (q − 1).
The main working principle of addition and subtraction in GF(2q) is by
performing standard polynomial addition and subtraction. We add or subtract
equal powers. The coefficient additions or subtractions are done in the under-
lying field GF(2). This operations are computed according to equations
G(x) = F (x) +R(x) =
q−1∑
i=0
gix
imod2, g(i)=f(i)+r(i) mod 2
Always keep in mind that we use modulo 2 subtraction(addition) with the
coefficients.
The principle of multiplication is as follows. Firstly, two elements of the
finite field which we represent by polynomials, are multiplied by using the poly-
nomial multiplication rule. All the coefficients are part of GF(2). The prod-
uct of polynomial multiplication is divided by a certain polynomial (irreducible
polynomial) and only the remainder after the polynomial division is considered.
An irreducible polynomials for the module reduction is needed. Recall that
irreducible polynomials are roughly comparable to prime numbers, their only
factors are 1 and the polynomial itself.
In a given field GF(2q) and the corresponding irreducible polynomial p(x),
the inverse of (a−1) of a non zero element, where a ∈ GF(2q) is calculated
according to:
• Let A(x) & B(x) ∈ GF (2)
• C(x) =
q∑
i=0
cix
imod2, ci ∈ GF (2)
• Multiplication of two elements is performed as: C(x) ≡ A(x)∗B(x)modP (x)
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3.3.1 Generators in Fields
A really important concept of finite fields are generators. Generator is an ele-
ment in which all the following powers take on all the powers starting from 1
and so on [54]. Let’s take as an example the field z(13). Firstly, let’s try power
of 2 with modul 13
(21) = 2; (22)%13 = 4; (23)%13 = 8; (24)%13 = 3; (25)%13 = 6;
(26)%13 = 12; (27)%13 = 11; (28)%13 = 9; (29)%13 = 5;
(29)%13 = 10; (29)%13 = 7; (36)%13 = 1;
As a result, is clear that 2 is a generator. It is obvious that generators
are hard to be found. The polynomial x+1, which can be written 0x03, is the
simplest generator for Galois Field GF(28). Its powers represent all the 255
values of the field, except 0. The table in Figure 1.4 is a table of ”anti-logs”
or ”exponential”. This table gives each possible power. Ers is the field element
and is given by (03)rs. The table in Figure 1.5 is a table of ”logarithm”. In this
table Lrs is a field element which fulfills rs = 03L(rs). These tables are created
by using a multiplying function. Then after the generation of these ”look up”
tables, a mathematical operation based on these ”look up” tables is performed.
For addition and subtraction (simple XOR) is not necessary to use look up
tables. You should use these tables only for multiplication and multiplication
inverse. For instance, let’s multiply ff ∗ e8. By using the logarithm table is
Figure 3.4: Table of ”exponentials”. Image taken on [54]
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Figure 3.5: Table of ”logarithms”. Image taken on [54]
obvious that Lff = 0.7 and Le8 = b4. This means that
(ff) ∗ (e8)=(03)07 * (03)b4
=(03)07+b4 =(03)bb
If the sum is bigger than ff just subtract 255. Now, use exponential table
to look up (03)bb and to get the result b1.
To find the multiplicative inverse of each element field, use again the look
up tables. If p is generator 03, then the inverse of prs is pff−rs. For instance,
if I need to find the inverse of a4, I look in the ”logarithmic table” to see that
a4 = p17, so the inverse of pff−17=pe8, and from exponential table is clear that
the result is 8f .
In chapter 5 a detailed implementation of GF(28) is given. Some measure-
ments are done about how fast multiplication and multiplication inverse of the
field are. The results are shown at chapter 5. According to the results, is not
difficult and is clear to come in conclusion that GF(28) is the fastest one. This
comes as the result of the usage of ”look up” tables for mathematical operations,
such as multiplication and multiplication inverse.
35
3.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
Private information retrieval is a database technique that uses idea from cryp-
tography to protect the privacy of the users by hiding the queries details from
the administrators of the database. The basic idea of PIR is, that we need to
protect the identity of the query not the identity of the user. If we want to
protect the identity of the user we can use Tor.
Basically you can seek a record from the database and database server sends
everything back to you. The privacy protection in that case is perfect but com-
munication overhead is huge. This is not practical and for that reason is needed
something to make PIR Protocol practical in real world. Non-triviality is what
is required in order to make it practical. Non-triviality refers to, communication
cost must be in O(n), where n is the number of bits in the database.
Regarding security, PIR scheme has to provide the following two character-
istics.
• Correctness : Every time a client queries a particular block i-th in the
database, he receives correctly that particular block.
• Privacy: The database operator does not gain any information about
which particular block in the database, the client is quering of.
PIR protocols can be classified according to the following criteria:
1. The privacy they offer to the clients.
2. If data are hosted by a single server or by multiple servers which are not
communicating with each other.
According to the privacy, they can be classified as follows:
• Computational PIR (cPIR). Provides privacy against computationally bounded
server(s). In that class, the query is encoded in such a way that the server
can serve the data and learn nothing about the retrieved data and the
queries. Goldberg and Olumofin in [67], have proved that a cPIR pro-
tocol can outplay the trivial PIR protocol. They here showed that cPIR
protocol proposed by Gaborit and Melchor [60], is even faster than trivial
one when using common network connections. They proved it by using
empirical results. Main advantage of cPIR protocol is that the communi-
cation cost is reduced by using recursion.
• Information-theoritic PIR (itPIR). Provides privacy even against compu-
tationally unbounded server(s). Goldberg and Olumofin in [67], here also
have proved that an itPIR protocol can have better performance than the
trivial PIR protocol. In [19] Chor et al. showed that there is no non-trivial
itPIR in the case when there is only one single database server.
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In [?] the authors have combined the positive aspects of cPIR and itPIR
protocol. This protocol is called hybrid PIR. It includes the recursive advantage
of cPIR and the low computation and communication cost of itPIR. This hybrid
PIR has lower costs than PIR protocols of cPIR and itPIR classes. It is well-
suited for databases which can hold large numbers of small data.
According to whether the data is hosted by a single server or multiple non-
communication servers, they can be classified as follows:
• Single-Server PIR. A single server hosts the entire database and all the
queries are sent to this server.
• Multi-Server PIR. Database is replicated to l > 1 servers and each server
holds an entire copy of x. For k ≤ l servers, the queries are issued con-
currently. Over the years different improvements to this simple l-servers
have been proposed. In [19] a simple (l-1)-private l-server PIR scheme
has been proposed. This scheme involves two-server with communication
complexity O(n 13 ), and it is based on XOR queries. This type of query is
common and practical since it is deployed on many ”real world” databases.
The problem with this scheme is, that this scheme is not robust. If any
of 2 servers do not respond or just one bit flips, the user will not obtain
the correct result. Goldberg in [17] proposed a scheme which is robust
and eliminates the above problem. The approach in this paper yields a
t − private v − Byzantine − robust k − out − of − l PIR. This means
that the scheme involves l replicated versions of the database, provides
query privacy if up to t servers collude and for reconstructing the query
result it is sufficient that at least k servers respond, from which at most
v are allowed to respond byzantine. This byzantine-robust PIR scheme
provides protection for information-theoritic privacy against coalitions of
up to all servers. One of the responding servers, hones the result with
a factor of 3. Moreover, this protocol provides information-theoritic pro-
tection of database contents against collusions of limited number of the
servers. Additionally, even if some of the servers return the incorrect in-
formation, the user is still able to compute the correct result. To add
robustness this scheme also uses Shamir secret sharing threshold scheme.
The communication cost is O(l).
The effectiveness of PIR depends on the measurement of the communica-
tion complexity and storage overhead. Communcation complexity, is the total
number of bits which are exchanged between the user and the servers. Storage
overhead, is the ratio between the total number of bits stored on all the servers
and the number of bits in the database.
There are three basic ways how to achieve non-triviality, as the followings:
1. Homomorphic cryptography. Homomorphic encryption allows to perform
mathematical operations over a ciphertext, and it generates an encrypted
result. When this result is decrypted, it matches the result of opera-
tions performed over a plaintext. In [46], Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky
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. Image taken on [3]
Figure 3.6: Basic idea of Private Information Retrieval
proposed a PIR scheme which uses a cryptographic construction based on
homomorphic encryption. This generic construction is based on Damgard-
Jurik cyptosystem. The communication overhead here has complexity
O(kd2 d
√
n + kd), where n is the database size in bits, k is a security pa-
rameter, and d ∈ N . The first practical fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) system was published by Gentry [56]. In [56], he also published
an abstract method of how to construct FHE from rings. The key of this
scheme is bootstraping the construction. By bootstraping construction,
the ciphertext can be updated by homomorphically evaluating the decryp-
tion circuit. The new ciphertext has only gone through a circuit as deep
as the decryption circuit. Since this paper by Gentry was published, two
other FHE schemes have been published. One is published by Smart and
Vercauteren [47], which improves the original system proposed by Gen-
try. Another one is published by van Dijk [51], which is based on the
construction of the integers.
2. Trusted hardware. Hardware-based PIR uses trusted hardware which re-
duce computation and communication complexities. There are not too
much PIR protocol based on trusted hardware. The first approach was
done by Smith and Safford [23], and it was proposed solely to reduce
the communication complexity. For each query, a trusted hardware reads
all data from one external database and returns the requested data back
to the user. Iliev and Smith in [49] and [53] proposed a PIR scheme
based on trusted hardware. Here, for each query, the online process cost
is O1. However, for each k queries, where k << n, the database needs
to be reshuﬄed with computation cost O(nlogn). In [21] another PIR
scheme based on trusted hardware is proposed. This scheme is infor-
mation theoretical secured. The communication complexity is O(logn),
oﬄine communication cost is O(n) and the online process cost is O(1).
3. Coding theory. In my thesis the problem above is solved by using the
third way, Coding theory. In the following section the protocol which we
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decided to implement will be explained in details.
3.4.1 Private Information Retrieval based on Shamir Se-
cret Sharing
In this section an analytical description and one example of the protocol is
given. The protocol is k-private v-Byzantine-robust t-out-of-n PIR. It
means that if only t of n servers need to respond and even though k servers
collude, no information of query will be revealed and v of those t servers are
Byzantine. The choice of Finite Field (FF), the set of Shamir indices (I) ∈
FF have to be made in advance of storing data in the database. This protocol
allows the content of the database not to be revealed from coalitions of up to τ
servers (τ− independent PIR). The communication cost here is O(n) times
the size of the block, where n is the number of servers. This scheme has two
restrictions in which cases it can not be used, as the followings:
• If the user stores information in database which is different from what
client wants to retrieve, or if there is more than one such client.
• In the same time not more than one client can retrieve the data from the
database. Multiple clients could not use the same database since they
would not use the same FF.
Analytical descritpion
Parameters:
n: total number of servers
k: desired privacy level (number of servers which can collude and learn
nothing about the client’s query.)
d: size of the database (in bits). The database here is treated as a matrix.
Each matrix is rectangular with n-rows and b-columns.
b: size of the blocks (in bits). If all the files are the same size (in bits), then
each file is treated as a single block.
w: size of word within a block (each word is 8 bit)
FF: 2w = 28
I: a set of Shamir indices from FF such that I ≥ n
Calculate:
r: n/b blocks. The database is divided into d/b b-bit blocks.
s: b/w words. Each block in a database is divided into b/w w-bit words.
Let’s suppose Wj1, ....,Wjs represent the words in a particular block j and
wj1, ..., wjs represent the Shamir secret sharing computation of the above words.
Each server stores a block as a sequence of s elements. All s elements are part
of the FF(256). For instance server i stores the block j as a sequence of s
39
elements wij1, wij2, ...., wijs of FF(256). The elements wijc are computed using
Shamir secret sharing scheme.
For each word Wjc in a particular block j a user chooses a random polynomial
pjc of degree k. The coefficients of the pjc should be random values of FF(256),
except of the free term. The free term should be Wjc. Then, he sends pjc (αi)
to server i to store it as its wijc, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So, the values of wijc, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n are k-private n-way Shamir secret shares of Wjc.
Client Side (querying a particular block j in the database):
Step 1: Choose a vector of size r (in bits). All elements of the vector, with
the exception of the j-th element, have the value 0. The j-th element of the
vector has the value 1.
Step 2: Choose n random distinct indices α1, ..., αn from I. For the applica-
tion the values are α1 = 1, α2 = 2, ....., αn = n
Step 3: For each element of the vector choose a random polynomial of degree
k. So, in total we have r random polynomials f1, f2, ...., fr each of degree k.
Step 4: Compute ui = [f1(ai), ...., fr(ai)] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Step 5: Send ui to server number i
Server Side (each honest server):
Step 1: Receive ui = [ui1, ...., uir]. This is a vector with r elements and all
elements ∈ FF(256)
Step 2: Compute Pic =
∑
1≤j≤r
uijwjc for 1 ≤ c ≤ s
Step 3: Send back to the client [Pi1, ....., Pis]
Client
Step 1: The client takes [P11, ....., P1s], ....[Pn1, ...., Pns] from the n servers.
β1, ......, βt are the numbers of t servers which respond.
Step 2: When t ≤ k+τ , send an error message ” not enough servers replied”.
Step 3: The minimum number of honest servers is in the range
√
t(k + τ) <
h ≤ t
Step 4: Recover the secret using polynom interpolation method. For in-
stance, if the threhold scheme used is (7,3), then to recover the secret 5 servers
need to collude.
Why does it work? It is easy to point out that this protocol gives you privacy
but you need it also to give you information retrieval. The reason why it gives
you information retrieval is because Shamir secret sharing has a nice property
which is called linearity.
For instance, lets suppose f(0) = a and m(0) = b. Then, (f +m)(0) = a+ b.
So it is homomorphic under addition. Moreover, it is also homomorphic under
scalar multiplication. For instance, if g(0) = a → c ∗ g(0) = c ∗ a. To a PIR
protocol you have a vector-matrix multiplication. This multiplication requires
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Figure 3.7: PIR based on SSS technique. Each server holds a database with
n-rows and b-columns. The values in the matrices are computed using SSS. The
vector e keeps the values 0 and 1. The user applies SSS technique over that
vector and distributes it to each server
only scalar multiplication and addition mathematical operations. Also, the re-
construction part requires only scalar multiplication and addition mathematical
operations. Shamir secret sharing scheme is homomorphic under both scalar
multiplication and addition as proved above, so this protcol works perfectly
fine. Multiplying the shares of the vector query with the shares of the files is
the same as multiplying the real values of vector array which has values 0 and 1
with words W . Below is given an example of the protocol we have implemented.
Example
Setup: Let’s suppose the client has a folder with 4 files, each 6 byte, and
he wants to query the second file. Let the threshold scheme be (7, 3). All
mathematical operations are done over FF(256). The set of Shamir indices (I)
is [α1 = 1, α2 = 2, α3 = 3, α4 = 4, α5 = 5, α6 = 6, α7 = 7]. These are the points
the polynomials will be evaluated. Each file is treated as a single block and the
size of each word is 1 byte. Let’s suppose the client’s files are as the followings:
1. file1.txt = [c,r,y,p,t,o]
2. file2.txt = [s,h,a,m,i,r]
3. file3.txt = [s,e,c,r,e,t]
4. file4.txt = [p,r,i,v,a,t]
SSS of the files: He performs SSS for each word of the blocks. For the first
block (file1.txt) he creates 6 random polynomials (one per each word) of degree
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Figure 3.8: PIR based on SSS technique. After vector-matrix multiplication.
The client takes back the result of the multiplication from each server and then
reconstructs the block which he queries of.
3. The same procedure is for the other blocks. All coefficients of polynomial
are randomly chosen and are elements of FF(256) with the exception of the free
term which is our secret.
The first word of the first block is c and its numerical representation (ASCII
code) is 99. This is our secret and at random we obtain two numbers which are
part of FF(256) : a1 = 118, a2 = 68.
Our polynomial to produce secret shares is therefore: y = 99 + 118x +
68x2. The result is ana array V with values V= [81,34,76,143,87,120,52]. After
performing the same procedure for other words of the first block, a matrix with
7 rows and 6 columns is created. All values in the matrix are the shared ones.
Matrices for all the blocks are given below:
M1 =

81 −124 −74 −116 −66 107
34 95 15 42 122 7
76 −30 −41 −67 −120 38
143 −105 104 −83 82 74
87 −2 −35 102 69 −20
120 −75 −94 61 42 −65
52 45 57 6 74 66

M2 =

30 −40 −75 −31 −116 74
117 33 −62 31 2 −88
−95 23 −41 20 −44 98
−87 −66 122 −53 15 24
−76 −21 54 −6 39 120
−38 123 −45 115 −37 122
21 34 57 90 100 39

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M3 =

−71 127 −75 81 −101 93
34 −126 −59 15 72 −24
−118 −120 97 38 −49 −51
120 −31 −21 101 111 −10
42 −106 −39 55 120 −60
84 27 59 22 54 121
37 111 101 16 4 12

M4 =

−89 97 230 −12 35 −27
−36 103 −55 11 −91 30
−73 −43 11 102 −72 −38
61 90 17 −16 −69 −36
24 13 116 −9 −114 −101
127 26 17 83 88 61
211 3 57 166 147 250

Then, take the first rows from each matrix above and store them in the first
server, the second rows from each matrix and store them in the second server
and the same for all the others. The databases stored in each server are shown
below:
S1 =

81 −124 −74 −116 −66 107
30 −40 −75 −31 −116 74
−71 127 −75 81 −101 93
−89 97 230 −12 35 −27
 S2 =

34 95 15 42 122 7
117 33 −62 31 2 −88
34 −126 −59 15 72 −24
−36 103 −55 11 −91 30

S3 =

76 −30 −41 −67 −120 38
−95 23 −41 20 −44 98
−118 −120 97 38 −49 −51
−73 −43 11 102 −72 −38
 S4 =

143 −105 104 −83 82 74
−87 −66 122 −53 15 24
120 −31 −21 101 111 −10
61 90 17 −16 −69 −36

S5 =

87 −2 −35 102 69 −20
−76 −21 54 −6 39 120
42 −106 −39 55 120 −60
24 13 116 −9 −114 −101
 S6 =

120 −75 −94 61 42 −65
−38 123 −45 115 −37 122
84 27 59 22 54 121
127 26 17 83 88 61

S7 =

52 45 57 6 74 66
21 34 57 90 100 39
37 111 101 16 4 12
211 3 57 166 147 250

Client Side (querying second file)
Now after all shares of the files are stored in each server, the clients wants to
query the second file while letting the administator of the storage system know
nothing about it.
When the client queries the second file, an array with values [0,1,0,0] is
created. Then, the procedure above is repeated. 4 random polynomials of degree
3 are created. Each polynomial has distinct random values for their coefficents
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with the exception of free terms which are the secrets. Afer performing SSS, a
matrix as below is created.
M =

82 105 7 65
195 73 57 90
137 42 101 168
210 198 218 48
211 30 90 200
89 109 100 250
19 240 177 12

Then, the first row of that matrix is sent to the first server, the second row to
the second server and so on.
Server Side
The servers received those arrays with share values. Then, each server per-
forms a vector-matrix multiplication. The multiplication here is a mathematical
operation performed over FF(256).
Client
The servers send back to the client the vectors as below.
P1 =
[
111 240 4 120 6 187
]
P2 =
[
109 5 26 100 209 3
]
P3 =
[
46 12 111 79 78 83
]
P4 =
[
13 52 206 183 245 100
]
P5 =
[
50 241 52 200 96 40
]
P6 =
[
2 35 224 161 98 137
]
P7 =
[
167 8 198 173 234 2
]
The client takes them and then reconstructs the secret. To reconstruct it 5 out
of 7, servers need to collude. The secret taken back is the second file (file2.txt).
What can be done more
The implementation of this protocol can be extended in order to query q
blocks with the cost of one block. Using basic way to query q blocks, a ma-
trix with q rows as below is created. Instead of performing a vector-matrix
multiplication a matrix-matrix multiplication is performed.
Q =

0 0 1 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 1 . . . 0
0 1 0 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 . . . 1

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To avoid that, use Ramp scheme. Let’s suppose there is a polynomial like :
r2x
2 +r1x+S0. Using ramp scheme the order of polynomial is increased by one
and the two lowest coefficents are two different secrets. The polynomial will be
r3x
3 + r2x2 +S1x+S0. Two secrets can be shared now in the same secret share
polynomial.
If q blocks are being queried a vector of polynomials
V = [f1(x), f2(x), f3(x), ...fr(x)] is created. When f1(x) is evaluated the result
is the first column of the matrix Q, the evaluation of second polynomial gives
us the second column of matrix Q, and so on.
Results
The table below holds the results for computation cost, storage cost, upload
and download for our protocol and for the extended version of it.
Performance report
PIR Protocol based
on SSS
Extended version
Computation cost qrs rs
Storage cost rs rs
Upload qr r
Download qs s
r- the number of rows in database
s- s-word block of data stored in each row of the databse
q-number of blocks we query
3.5 Summary
An overview of existing secret sharing scheme is given. I choose to use Shamir
secret sharing as a threshold scheme. An overview of galoa field is given. All ba-
sic mathematical operations are performed over galoa field (256) as it offers the
maximum speed. All other galoa fields perform mathematical operations slower
than this one. The main reason is using look-up tables to perfrom multiplication
and inverse multiplication. Later the existing PIR protocol are described. An
analytical description of the protocol is given. Then it is extended in order to
query q blocks with the cost of one block. To achieve it use rampified scheme.
In the end a performance report of the protocol and the extended version is
given.
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Chapter 4
Deployment of the PIR
application in Amazon Web
Service(AWS)
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the way how the application is deployed in Amazon Web Service
is shown. The application is divided into two different activities; the first activity
runs in a local computer while the other one runs in Amazon Web Service.
The first activity is an one-time activity and the only algorithm used is
Shamir secret sharing. This algorithm, which is described in details in chap-
ter 3, is used to generate the shares of the files. The second activity runs as
many times as we want to query back one file out of m-files and both of the
algorithms described in chapter 3 are used. Shamir secret sharing algorithm is
used to generate the shares of vector query and Private information retrieval
algorithm is used to calculate the vector-matrix multiplication. Then Lagrange
interpolation is used to take back the file which is queried by the client.
This chapter has two main sections. In the first one it is given a detailed
description of the Amazon Web Service’s infrastructure. Also the functionalities
of some of the building blocks of AWS are described. The focus is more in
Storage and Compute blocks.
Storage block includes:
• Amazon S3
• Amazon Glacier
• Amazon Snowball
Compute block includes:
46
• Amazon EC2
• Elastic BeanStalk
• Lambda
The application uses as a compute block ’EC2 instance’, and as a storage
block ’Amazon S3’.
In the second part, is shown the way this architecture is built and the steps
for running the application. Another reason to deploy the application in AWS
is, AWS supports HTTP methods. HTTP methods used in the application are
GET and POST. To upload the shares generated from one-time activity two
different ways are followed. The first way is using S3 storages and connecting
them with EC2 instances. The second way is using FileZilla which is a free
FTP solution where both a server and a client are available.
In this chapter, I describe the way how I have built a trusted cloud environ-
ment. The threshold scheme used in the thesis is (6,3). The servers in Amazon
scenario are EC2 instances. In total are used 7 EC2 instances, where one of
them is the client. The client is used only to make a connection with other EC2
instances. After the connection is done the algorithms deployed in these EC2
instance run and the result is sent back at the client EC2 instance. For more
details please see the section 3 of this chapter.
4.2 Amazon Infrastructure
Amazon Web Service provides a wide variety of technology services. AWS is
a cloud platform with fully-functional, flexible technology infrastructure. To
be fully-functional there are some requirements cloud providers need to meet.
AWS meets all these requirements and since 2006 it has been the main cloud
platform used by different companies. The requirements are listed below:
1. Computation
2. Global Infrastructure
3. Storage
4. Security
5. Application Services
6. Database
7. Content Distribution
8. Development
9. Big Data
10. Deployment and Management
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Figure 4.1: AWS architecture. Image retrieved from http://www.slideshare.
net/AmazonWebServices/aws-webcast-29364319
11. Support
12. Integration with Existing Infrastructure
For this thesis the most important requirements are: security, computation
and storage. Security topic is covered in chapter 2. Now let’s talk about the
two others.
Note: If you want to know more about the other requirements
please go to the link https://aws.amazon.com/choosing-a-cloud-platform/
Computing block:
Amazon EC2: Amazon elastic compute cloud provides resizable computing
capacity in AWS. Using EC2 eliminates the need to invest money in computing
hardware up front. In that way money are saved and also it allows applications
to be developed and deployed faster. It is a virtual server. It is used to launch a
virtual machine and then to configure all networking and security settings. One
benefit of using Amazon EC2 is that it can be scaled up automatically and in
order to handle extra traffic, it adds capacity. Amazon EC2 is a virtual environ-
ment, and Amazon EC2 environments are called instances. There are different
types of instances. They can be classified according to the combinations of stor-
age size, CPU power, networking capacity and amount of power. Amazon EC2
instance ranges from small instances which perform small tasks to large instance
48
with high performance to perform tasks like data warehousing. Moreover, there
are even instances with high graphic processing capabilities which can perform
tasks like 3D rendering. Based on compute power it is possible to mix and match
different types of EC2 instances. Amazon Machine Images (AMI) is provided
by Amazon, and it is a pre-configured template for our instances. It can include
an operating system like Linux or Windows. They also can include a wide range
of components, like preinstalled software packages and operating system.
To create, deploy and terminate an EC2 instance firstly you have to log in
to the AWS management console. Now click on Amazon EC2 icon. To launch
the EC2 instance the following steps need to be taken:
1. To begin the process click ”Launch Instance”.
2. Choose an AMI and click ”Select” next to the AMI you want to pick. You
can choose Windows, Linux, CentOS etc operating system.
3. Choose an instance type.
4. Configure instance details. In this step access, monitoring, network set-
tings, and other options are added.
5. Add storage. In this step is possible to change the drive size or add more
virtual hard drives
6. Tag instance.
7. Configure security groups. It accepts the default security group as it allows
SSH from anywhere to this instance.
8. Click on ”Review and Launch”. By clicking review you can see all your
settings for your EC2 instance.
The customers can upload their Public Key or create their own Key Pair
in AWS Management console. To state their access to the private key, they
should check the acknowledgement checkbox. The role of Key Pairs is to control
access to the instance after it is created otherwise will not be able to access the
instance. Now after this process is done the instance’s state has been changed
to running. It is now ready for use. To find the Public DNS, check to the box
next to the instance. DNS is used to access the system in the same way as it
was in data center.
In this thesis 7 EC2 instances are created and launched in that way. The
region chosen to deploy the application is Ireland (Dublin) and the operating
system used is Linux. While choosing the region three important things should
be kept in mind:
• Minimize costs
• Address regulatory requirements
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• Optimize latency. If the end users which access the applications are located
in Europe they can access the application faster than end users located
in other continents. This happens because accessing the application close
with the region you have chosen on AWS, reduces the latency significantly.
Storage block:
Amazon S3: Amazon simple storage system is highly scalable, safe and
secure object storage in the cloud. It is used to store and retrieve any amount of
data, at any time, from anywhere on the web. Using S3 storage makes it easy to
store as much data as it is required and it can be accessed it whenever is needed
to. One major benefit of using S3 storage is that, it avoids the companies buying
hardware and paying for storage that is not being used. You pay only for the
storage and bandwith you use. Most of the companies use S3 storage for media
hosting, hosting high-traffic websites, for backup, or for software delivery. It can
alse be used to store sensitive information and back up our informtation off-site.
It also supports versioning, so is possible to go back to any previous version
when is required to. It is designed with 99.99% durability. It is very reliable.
Moreover it is very easy to use S3 storage. Is possible to programmatically store,
retrieve and manage data using REST or SOAP web services. Here, I access S3
storage using REST services. Other ways to access it, is by using command line
interface or AWS management console.
Amazon S3 stores data as ”objects” and these objects are stored within
folders that are called ”buckets”. Buckets are the container for the objects.
Is possible to have more than one bucket. For each bucket the access can
be controlled; like, who creates, adds, deletes, and lists the objects in that
bucket. The first thing is uploading the file needed to store in the bucket. Later
permissions on the object are set. It is private until we decide to share it. Below
the way how to create bucket, add objects on it and delete the objects is shown.
1. Click on ” Amazon S3” icon on AWS management console homepage.
2. Click on ”Create Bucket” in order to create a place where to hold the
objects. Then keep the default region ”Dublin” unchanged and add a
bucket name. The bucket name can not be changed later and is visible to
the URL which points to the object saved in that bucket. You only pay
for what you store in the bucket and not for creating or deleting a bucket.
3. Click on ”Add Files” to upload data. The data uploaded for my application
are the shares of the files which are generated by the one-time activity.
It is very easy to open the file or delete it. The only thing you need to
do is to right-click on the file in that bucket and then you can take this
operation. The same way with the bucket.
Mount S3 bucket to EC2 instance
To get the shares from S3 bucket and upload them in EC2 instance I have
used Java code. The sample code which uploads the shares to EC2 instance is
shown below:
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Figure 4.2: EC2 client sending back the file taken by other EC2 instances to
our S3 bucket
System.out.println("getting share from s3 location");
BasicAWSCredentials awsCreds = new
BasicAWSCredentials("AKIAJR2FJDU2UYMZQD4A",
"DFR0leDYgeBS6Vf0O04oyUHwF6qTRh9d49Pwt+dU");
AmazonS3 s3client =new AmazonS3Client(awsCreds);
S3Object s3object=s3client.getObject(new
GetObjectRequest(bucketName,"shares.txt"));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new
InputStreamReader(s3object.getObjectContent()));
After uploading the shares to EC2 instances, the algorithms deployed in
EC2 instances will run and then the result is sent back to the EC2 client.
The EC2 client will then send the required file back to one S3 bucket named
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”archistar01”, and from here the queried file can be downloaded (more on this
in the next section). The scenario above is shown in the figure 4.2
4.3 Trusted cloud environment architecture
In this section the trusted cloud environment I have built to run the application
is shown. As previously stated in total there are 7 EC2 instances. One of them is
the client. The application hosted in AWS can be accessed using URL typing in
any type of web browser. The URL used has the IP of the client’s EC2 instance.
After typing the URL in the web browser and run it the client communicates
with other EC2 instances and after these, EC2 instances run the algorithms
deployed in them, and the result is sent back to the client. The result in this
case is one file.
Now two different scenarios are used in order to take back the desired result.
One scenario is the client’s communication with bucket ”archistar01” and the
result is sent to the bucket. From here the file is downloaded to the local
machine. In the second scenario, after client receives the result, the file is
directly downloaded in the local machine. The steps taken to build this trusted
cloud environment are shown below:
Step 1:
The application is split in two parts:
• Client part (a single EC2 instance)
• Server part(6 EC2 instances).
Step 2:
1. Shares from the files are generated in the local computer. This is one-time
activity. Shares from the files are generating using Shamir Secret Sharing
algorithm.
2. Then, I copy each share file to each ec2 instance /home/ec2-user/PIR/shares
folder using FileZila. In the previous section is showed the way how the
shares are uploaded to instances using a communication between S3 stor-
age and EC2 instances.
Step 3:
1. Create a post rest service which takes inputs as no files as file to be taken,
server number as query params, and shareOfqueries as post data. The
functionality of rest web service is as below:
• Get file from ec2 instance /home/ec2-user/PIR/shares folder
• Convert data to integer array
• Get Private information protocol shares using share and share of
queries to reconstruct file
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• Send this to client as string
2. Create war file for this project
3. Download tomcat server in each instance
4. Extract apache tomcat zip file in each instance
5. Copy war file to /home/ec2-user/PIR/apache-tomcat-version num-
ber/webapps
6. Run ./startup.sh(/home/ec2-user/PIR/apache-tomcat-version num-
ber/bin) in each instance
7. Now service will be available in each instance
Step 4:
In URL use as parameters, servers which is the total number of the EC2
instances(6 in our case), totalfiles which is the number of total files, and return-
FileNumber which is the file we want to take back
1. Call each service from client
2. Convert string to array integer
3. Recover file using recover method
4. Store file into your local machine
In figure 4.3 the architecture of our trusted cloud environment is shown.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, is shown the way how PIR application in Amazon is deployed.
The chosen cloud platform is Amazon web service because of the benefits it
provides to. Windows Azure could also be chosen but it is more convenient to
deploy the application in AWS. In the first section, the discussion is about the
building blocks of the Amazon with more focus in the storage and computing
blocks.
In the second section, is shown step by step how the application is deployed
in AWS. In the end, the figure 4.3 shows the trusted cloud environment. In
order to achieve that, the application is split in two parts. The client part is
used only to communicate with server part. All algorithms run in server part
and the client takes back the result and then, the result is stored to the local
computer from where the application is accessed.
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Chapter 5
Implementation Details
In this chapter some implementation details about the application are given.
Here is shown which alogrithms are used in order to implement the application.
A hard work is done in order to choose the best algorithms which give a desired
performance and highly secured random numbers. The methods with the best
possible complexity are implemented.
The application has two parts. The first part, is used only to generate
the shares of the files. In this part the only algorithm running is Shamir secret
sharing. The second part, is a client-server application. The algorithms running
here are, Shamir secret sharing and Private information retrieval.
This chapter contains three sections. In the first section, some implemen-
tation details about Shamir secret sharing algorithm are given. In the second
section, implementation details about the connection between the client and the
server are given. Moreover implementation details about Private information
retrieval protocol are given. In the end, measurements performance for the most
important methods of the application are published.
5.1 Shamir secret sharing implementation de-
tails
In order to implement and run SSS some important questions need to be solved.
In which finite field mathematical operations will perform on? How to generate
random coefficients of the polynomial in order that these coefficients be as ran-
dom as possible? It turns out that the finite field which gives the best possible
speed performance is finite field 256. The reason behind this is, that look-up
tables can be used in order to perform multiplication and inverse multiplication
operations.
For random numbers generation, since there are different algorithms which
can be implemented in order to produce random numbers, a design pattern
called Strategy Pattern is used. Using that design pattern different algorithms
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can be implemented in different classes and then in the methods which calculates
shares of the files is possible to put as its argument any type of these algorithms.
Finite Field 256:
Below is represented the code which describes how the finite field is created,
and some methods which do basic mathematical operations.
package galoisField;
public class FastFiniteField256 implements galoa{
//exponential table a vector with 256 elements
private static int[] Exp = new int[256];
//logarithm table vector with 256 elements
private static int[] Log= new int[256];
//this polynom is used as generator of the field
private static final int GENERATORPOLYNOMIAL=0x11B;
/*
* generation of look up tables can be found on
http://www.devkb.org/java/50-AES-256-bits-encrypter-decrypter-Java-source-code
*/
static {
int i, j;
Exp[0] = 1;
for (i = 1; i < 256; i++) {
j = (Exp[i-1] << 1) ˆ Exp[i-1];
if ((j & 0x100) != 0)
j ˆ= GENERATORPOLYNOMIAL;
Exp[i] = j;
}
for (i = 1; i < 255; i++)
Log[Exp[i]] = i;
}
In the above code the static block is used to generate all elements of Finite
field 256. Elements of this finite field are from 0 to 255. In order to generate
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all the elements of this field an irreducible polynomial is needed. Addition and
subtraction in FF(256) are simply XOR operation. The methods FFMulFast
and FFInv have been implemented according to the mathematical explanation
of multiplication and inversve multiplication , which is given in details in chapter
3 ( see section 3.3). Below you can find the code for FFMulFast method.
public int FFMulFast(int firstElement, int secondElement){
int temp=0;;
if (firstElement==0 || secondElement==0)
return 0;
temp= (Log[(firstElement&0xff)] & 0xff) + (Log[(secondElement&0xff)] &
0xff);
if (temp>255)
temp= temp-255;
return Exp[(temp&0xff)];
}
Horner evaluation
Even if the methods ”FFMulFast”, ”FFInv” and ”add” perform mathemat-
ical operations with a desired speed performance, I decide to further improve
the speed. In a scenario with files of a size of Mb or Gb calculation time is big
enough. So, by using Horner’s rule the number of multiplication operations is
reduced significantly. Here is not described how the multiplication operations
are reduced using Horner’s rule. If interested in knowing more visit the site
https://www.math10.com/en/algebra/horner.html.
The way how the Horner’s rule is implemented is shown in the code below:
public int hornerEvaluation(int y, int []coefficientsOfPolynomial) {
int degreeOfPolynomial=coefficientsOfPolynomial.length-1;
int result=coefficientsOfPolynomial[degreeOfPolynomial];
for (int i=degreeOfPolynomial-1; i>=0; i--) {
result = add(coefficientsOfPolynomial[i],FFMulFast(result&0xff,y));
}
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return result;
}
Generation of random numbers
In full code there is a single package which handles the generation of random
numbers. Each class in that package uses different algorithms for generation of
random numbers. In this package Strategy Pattern is used. The reason is
because there are different algorithms which can be used to generate random
numbers. Some algorithms are better in speed performance, the others are
better in security. Depending on what the clients are more concerned, is easy
to choose between these algorithms.
Here the full code of this package is not shown since there are hundred
lines of codes but is shown only some lines of a class which can be different
in different classes. The part of the code which is not presented here for the
class ”RandomGeneratorSHA1” is the same to all the other classes. What is
important to note is that all the classes are based on SecureRandom class. It is
a predefined class with predefined methods and is implemented by Oracle Inc.
package generationOfRandomNumbers;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
public class RandomGeneratorSHA1 implements randomCoeff {
private static final int NUMBER_OF_RANDOM_BYTES = 1 ;
private final SecureRandom csprng;
private int holdAllRndCoefficients [] ;
private byte[] bytes;
public RandomGeneratorSHA1() {
try {
csprng = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG");
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
csprng.nextBoolean();
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}In the code above the thing to be underlined is the line csprng = SecureRan-
dom.getInstance(”SHA1PRNG”);
The algorithm used here is ”SHA1PRNG”. Use it, if speed performance
is the main concern. It provides a performance speed 3 times faster than the
algorithm ”NativePRNG”. In this package, all the classes have almost the same
code with the exception of the above line. For instance, in that package there
is another class named ”RandomGeneratorNative”. In that class, the argument
of the static method ”getInstance”, is ”NativePRNG”. Use it when security is
the primarily concern.
Finding the appropriate algorithm for the generation of random numbers is
a very complex and a lot of work to be done. For generation of random numbers,
if not an appropriate algorithm is used, it can lead to a slow speed performance
and more important the generated numbers are not random at all.
Reconstruction
protected int LagranP(int[] coefficientValue, int[] valueOfPolynomial)
{
//the length of m is equal to 3 in our scenario (6,3)
int m = coefficientValue.length;
assert m == valueOfPolynomial.length;
int result = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < m; i++)
result = ff256.add(result, ff256.FFMulFast(production(i,
coefficientValue), valueOfPolynomial[i]));
return result;
}
In ”Reconstruction” class there are three methods:
1. returnfile()
Is a method which gives back the desired file
2. LagranP() and production() are methods which are used to evaluate La-
grange’s interpolaion formula. From the piece of code above the produc-
tion() method in LagranP() method is called. Also in this method, the
methods of the class ”FastFiniteField256” are being called.
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5.2 Client-Server implementation
For communication between client and server a rest web service is used. In
the service part PIR algorithm package is imported. It is used to do vector-
matrix multiplication. In the client part shamir secret share algorithm package
is imported. It is used to calculate the shares of the query vector, and to recover
the desried file.
Server is used to take the shares of the files either from S3 bucket or from
FileZila, the shares of the query vector, to calculate the vector-matrix multi-
plication, and send this result back to client. Then, client takes the result,
uses returnfile method from ”Reconstruction” class and sends it to the local
computer from where the application is being accessed.
Client part: The client class is called ”PIRClient”. There are three methods
in this class:
1. returnFile(). This method is a rest method. Its return type is a Response
and its parameters are QueryParam. That means while typing the url of
the application in a web browser the values after ”?”, are arguments of
this method. This method calls Reconstruction and Share classes from the
package of shamir algorithm. Moreover, HTTP methods are used here.
2. getIPAddress(). As its name applies, it is used to get the IP of EC2
instances.
3. getsharesFromEachistance(). As its name applies, it is used to get the
shares from EC2 instances.
Server part: The sever class is called PIRServer. This class has three
methods:
1. protocolShares(). This method is used to get the shares of the files and
the shares of the vector array. Then, it uses the method pirprotocolshares1
from PrivateInformationRetrieval class, to calculate vector-matrix multi-
plication.
2. getSharesFromFile(). As its name applies, this method is used to get the
shares of the files from FileZila or S3 bucket.
3. getSecretShare(). This method is used to convert post data to integer
array.
Note: The Java code of Server and Client class can be found in
Appendix
PrivateInformationRetrieval class is used to implement PIR algorithm. This
class has four methods.
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1. allSharesForFiles(). This method is used to calculate and put in an Ar-
rayList all shares of the files. Each element of this ArrayList is a 2D-array.
ArrayList is used since it is the most preferable List when the main con-
cern is fast iteration. Moreover, its method ”add” has a complexity O(1).
Complexity O(1) means that the performance will be the same as iterating
only once or a thousand times.
2. allSharesForEachFile(). This method is used to take the first rows of each
of the matrices above and put it into a new matrix, then take the second
rows of each of the matrices above and put it into a new matrix and so
on. ArrayList is also used here since its method get has complexity O(1)
3. pirprotocolshares1(). This method is used to calculate vector-matrix mul-
tiplication. Its return type is an array.
4. readyForReconstruction(). This method has the same result as the method
above but here a 2D-array is returned. The first element for each 2D-array
is used as a ”key” element for returnFile() method in Reconstruction class.
5.3 Measurements performance
In this section performance reports of some of the methods of the application
are shown. The methods to consider and which have effect in performance speed
are:
1. calculatethresholdscheme (). This is used in ”Share” class to calculate the
shares of the file. In this method is used Horner’s rule to calculate the
polynomials.
2. returnfile (). This is used in Reconstruction class to recover the secret.
These methods call the methods of FastFiniteField256 class for performing
all basic mathematical operations.
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The first two graphs show the performace report for the one-time activity.
The graph below shows the performance report of the real world application.
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter some implementation details about the application are given.
This chapter begins with implementation details about SSS algorithm. For
this algorithm is necessary to implement finite field 256, to find a way how to
generate random numbers, to calculate polynomials and in the end to recover
the secret. For the calculation of the polynomials is used Horner’s rule and is
shown the way how it is implemented. Based on Lagrange interpolation, the
secret is recovered. Lagrange’s interpolaton implementation is shown in this
chapter.
Later we talked about the Client-Server communication. We explained what
is the role of each method in the client and server part. Moreover, we explained
the way we have implemented PIR algorithm.
In the end, performance report for shamir algorithm are published. The
average time to calculate the shares is 8Mb/s and the average time to recover the
secret is about 3.6Mb/s. This chapter ends with performance report of client-
server communication. The average time of this communication is 1.2Mb/s.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In the introduction the challenges with data outsourcing to the cloud are out-
lined. Privacy concerns, lack of control, quality of service and availability pose
risks to individual users and enterprises when adopting cloud services. An
overview of Amazon Web Service cloud platform security is given. In chapter
3, are discussed the existing PIR and secret share algorithms. My application
is a PIR protocol based on SSS algorithm. This algorithm provides a desired
privacy level with a complexity O(n) times the size of the block, where n is the
number of servers.
I am the first which have deployed that algorithm in an existing cloud plat-
form, such as AWS. The protocol that is implemented will have a substantial;
impact and broad distribution because it is flexible, compatible with existing
Shamir based storage solutions,and compatible with proactive security steps in
the storage systems. Programming language used in the thesis is JAVA. The
main reason to implement the protocol in Java is, because in the future work I
will try to integrate this application in an existing cloud platform as ”Archistar”.
In the end some performance measurements of the application are shown.
This application can share a file with 8Mb/s and can reconstrut it with a speed
of 3.6Mb/s. Moreover, in a future work I will try to expand the application in
a symmetric PIR.
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Appendix A
Client part
A.1 PIRClient.java
package com.pir.client;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
import java.io.FileReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.DataOutputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.net.HttpURLConnection;
import java.net.MalformedURLException;
import java.net.URL;
import java.util.Arrays;
import javax.ws.rs.GET;
import javax.ws.rs.POST;
import javax.ws.rs.Path;
import javax.ws.rs.Produces;
import javax.ws.rs.QueryParam;
import javax.ws.rs.core.MediaType;
import javax.ws.rs.core.Response;
import PIR.PrivateInformationRetrevial;
import galoisField.FastFiniteField256;
import generationOfRandomNumbers.RandomGeneratorSHA1;
import generationOfRandomNumbers.RndGeneratorAllAlgorithm;
import secretSharing.FileToBeTaken;
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import secretSharing.Reconstruction;
import secretSharing.Share;
@Path("/audit")
public class PIRClient {
static byte[] output = null;
static String[] ipAddress = getIPAddress();
/*
* service method to return file by getting shares from different
servers
*/
@GET
@Path("/getFile")
@Produces(MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN)
public Response returnFile(@QueryParam("severs") int noOfServers,
@QueryParam("totalfiles") int noOfFiles,
@QueryParam("returnFileNumber") int FileNumber) throws
IOException {
if (noOfServers <= 0 || noOfFiles <= 0 || FileNumber <= 0
|| FileNumber > noOfFiles) {
return Response.serverError().build();
}
PrivateInformationRetrevial pir = new
PrivateInformationRetrevial();
Reconstruction OneFileBack = new Reconstruction();
FileToBeTaken back = new FileToBeTaken();
Share share = new Share();
byte[] arrayOfQueries = new byte[noOfFiles];
arrayOfQueries[FileNumber - 1] = 1;
FastFiniteField256 GF256 = new FastFiniteField256();
URL url;
DataOutputStream wr;
HttpURLConnection conn;
int[][] sharesOfQueries1 = share.calculateThresholdScheme(
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arrayOfQueries, noOfServers, 3, new RndGeneratorAllAlgorithm(
new RandomGeneratorSHA1()), GF256);
String sharesOfQueries1AsString =
Arrays.deepToString(sharesOfQueries1);
int[][] arrayForReconstructions = new int[noOfServers][];
String shareInString = null;
/*
* This loop will connect to each EC2 service and get the shares
*/
for (int i = 0; i < noOfServers; i++) {
url = new URL("http://" + ipAddress[i]
+ ":8080/Audit/rest/audit/protocolShares?numberOfFiles="
+ noOfFiles + "&serverNumber=" + i + "&returnFileNumber="
+ FileNumber);
conn = (HttpURLConnection) url.openConnection();
synchronized (conn) {
conn.setDoOutput(true);
conn.setRequestMethod("POST");
conn.setRequestProperty("Accept", "text/plain");
wr = new DataOutputStream(conn.getOutputStream());
wr.write(sharesOfQueries1AsString.getBytes());
wr.flush();
wr.close();
if (conn.getResponseCode() != 200) {
throw new RuntimeException("Failed : HTTP error code : "
+ conn.getResponseCode());
}
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
conn.getInputStream()));
while (br.ready()) {
shareInString = br.readLine();
}
int[] arrayReconstruct =
getsharesFromEachistance(shareInString);
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arrayForReconstructions[i] = arrayReconstruct;
}
}
int[][] alles =
pir.readyForReconstruction(arrayForReconstructions);
int[][] sharesToViewSecret11 = new int[][] { alles[0], alles[3],
alles[1], alles[2], alles[5], alles[4] };
output = OneFileBack.recoverfile(sharesToViewSecret11);
// return file as attachment
return Response
.ok(output, MediaType.APPLICATION_OCTET_STREAM)
.header("content-disposition",
"attachment; filename = newfile.txt").build();
}
private static String[] getIPAddress() {
String[] ipAddress = new String[6];
try{
FileReader filereader = new
FileReader("/home/ec2-user/Audit/IpAddress.txt");
BufferedReader bufferedreader = new BufferedReader(filereader);
String line = bufferedreader.readLine();
int i=0;
while (line != null && i<6) {
ipAddress[i]= line;
i++;
line = bufferedreader.readLine();
}
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}catch(IOException e){
}
return ipAddress;
}
static int[] getsharesFromEachistance(String shareInString) {
int[] share1 = null;
String[] shareValues = shareInString.split(",");
share1 = new int[shareValues.length];
int i = 0, j = 0;
for (String is : shareValues) {
String removewhiteSpace = is.replaceAll("\\s", "");
if (is.contains("]")) {
share1[j] =
Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace.replaceAll("\\]",
""));
j++;
} else if (is.contains("[")) {
String removewhiteSpace1 = removewhiteSpace.replaceAll("\\[",
"");
share1[j] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace1.replaceAll(
"\\[", ""));
j++;
} else {
share1[j] =
Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace.replaceAll("\\]",
""));
j++;
}
}
return share1;
}
}
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Appendix B
Server part
B.1 PIRService.java
package com.audit.service;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.DataOutputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.net.HttpURLConnection;
import java.net.MalformedURLException;
import java.net.URL;
import java.util.Arrays;
import javax.ws.rs.GET;
import javax.ws.rs.POST;
import javax.ws.rs.Path;
import javax.ws.rs.Produces;
import javax.ws.rs.QueryParam;
import javax.ws.rs.core.MediaType;
import javax.ws.rs.core.Response;
import com.amazonaws.auth.BasicAWSCredentials;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.AmazonS3;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.AmazonS3Client;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.model.CannedAccessControlList;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.model.GetObjectRequest;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.model.ObjectMetadata;
import com.amazonaws.services.s3.model.S3Object;
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import SomeProvesForOurFullPIR.PrivateInformationRetrevial;
import galoisField.FastFiniteField256;
import generationOfRandomNumbers.RandomGeneratorSHA1;
import generationOfRandomNumbers.RndGeneratorAllAlgorithm;
import secretSharing.FileToBeTaken;
import secretSharing.Reconstruction;
import secretSharing.Share;
@Path("/audit")
public class PIRService {
byte[] output = null;
@POST
@Path("/protocolShares")
@Produces(MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN)
public String protocolShares(@QueryParam("numberOfFiles") int files,
@QueryParam("serverNumber") int serverNumber,
String sharesOfQueries,
@QueryParam("returnFileNumber") int fileNumber) {
int[][] sharesOfQueries1 = getSecrerShare(sharesOfQueries, files,
6);
int[][] share1 = getSharesFromFile(files);
int[] arrayForReconstruction = new int[share1.length];
PrivateInformationRetrevial pir = new
PrivateInformationRetrevial();
arrayForReconstruction = pir.pirprotocolshares1(share1,
sharesOfQueries1[serverNumber], fileNumber-1);
return Arrays.toString(arrayForReconstruction);
}
/**
* get the data from file and converted in to array
*
*/
int[][] getSharesFromFile(int numberOfFiles) {
String shareInString = null;
int[][] share1 = null;
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try {
/*
* System.out.println("getting share from s3 location");
* BasicAWSCredentials awsCreds = new
* BasicAWSCredentials("AKIAJR2FJDU2UYMZQD4A",
* "DFR0leDYgeBS6Vf0O04oyUHwF6qTRh9d49Pwt+dU"); AmazonS3
s3client =
* new AmazonS3Client(awsCreds); S3Object s3object =
* s3client.getObject(new GetObjectRequest( bucketName,
* "shares.txt"));
*/
// BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new
// InputStreamReader(s3object.getObjectContent()));
BufferedReader br = null;
br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(new File(
"/home/ec2-user/Audit/share/shares.txt")));
String line;
while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
shareInString = line;
}
String[] shareValues = shareInString.split(",");
for (String is : shareValues) {
}
share1 = new int[numberOfFiles][];
int lenghtEachArray = 0;
int m = 0;
for (String is : shareValues) {
if (is.contains("]") && m < numberOfFiles) {
share1[m] = new int[lenghtEachArray + 1];
m++;
lenghtEachArray = 0;
} else {
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lenghtEachArray++;
}
}
int i = 0, j = 0;
for (String is : shareValues) {
String removewhiteSpace = is.replaceAll("\\s", "");
if (is.contains("]")) {
share1[j][i] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace
.replaceAll("\\]", ""));
i = 0;
j++;
} else if (is.contains("[")) {
String removewhiteSpace1 = removewhiteSpace.replaceAll(
"\\[", "");
share1[j][i] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace1
.replaceAll("\\[", ""));
i++;
} else {
share1[j][i] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace
.replaceAll("\\]", ""));
i++;
}
}
} catch (IOException e) {
// TODO Auto-generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
}
return share1;
}
/**
* converted post data to int array
*
*/
int[][] getSecrerShare(String sharesOfQueries, int files, int
noOfservers) {
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int[][] share1 = null;
String[] shareValues = sharesOfQueries.split(",");
share1 = new int[noOfservers][files + 1];
int i = 0, j = 0;
for (String is : shareValues) {
String removewhiteSpace = is.replaceAll("\\s", "");
if (is.contains("]")) {
share1[j][i] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace.replaceAll(
"\\]", ""));
i = 0;
j++;
} else if (is.contains("[")) {
String removewhiteSpace1 = removewhiteSpace.replaceAll("\\[",
"");
share1[j][i] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace1.replaceAll(
"\\[", ""));
i++;
} else {
share1[j][i] = Integer.parseInt(removewhiteSpace.replaceAll(
"\\]", ""));
i++;
}
}
return share1;
}
}
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